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“Beyond differences and geographical boundaries, there lies a common interest” 
(Jean Monnet) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the spring of 1950, the French foreign minister Robert Schuman stated 
that:3 
 
“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will 
be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto 
solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the 
elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action 
taken must in the first place concern these two countries.” 
 
                                                             
1 I acknowledge the valuable comments of Igor van Loo. This paper is written as part of the research project 
What Good Markets Are Good For and made possible through the support of a grant from Templeton World 
Charity Foundation, Inc.. The opinions expressed in this publication are mine alone and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc.. 
2 Department of Organisation, Strategy and Entrepreneurship, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht 
University. E-mail: i.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl. 
3 May 9, 1950. Full text is available at: https://europa.eu.  
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In the same speech, now known as the Schuman declaration, Schuman 
proposed setting up a supranational organisation to pool European coal 
and steel production.4 About a year later, the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was among the first concrete 
achievements towards building a united Europe.5  
 
The ECSC Treaty contained two explicit competition provisions; both of 
which foreshadowed the European competition policy of today.6 These 
competition rules were poorly enforced, however, which was not least due 
to the lack of independence of the ECSC High Authority; an executive 
commission in charge of the implementation of the Treaty’s goals. 
Although the member states clearly agreed on the High Authority’s 
sovereignty, the political reality at the time was one of continuous 
interference by primarily France and Germany.7 This naturally called for a 
different competition policy design for the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Some years later, under heavy influence of the German-driven 
ordoliberalism doctrine, a strong European competition policy framework 
was established with an independent supranational competition authority.8 
 
The ECSC and EEC competition policy experience can be embedded in 
recent discussions on different types of capitalist systems, particularly the 
                                                             
4 Although the focus was on French and German production, Schuman was explicit about the possibility for 
other European countries to join the proposed organisation.  
5 This organisation was the outcome of a Treaty signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands in Paris on April 18, 1951.  
6 The ECSC Treaty contained both a cartel prohibition and merger provisions, see Chapter VI of this Treaty  – 
Agreements and concentrations, Articles 65 and 66. 
7 Article 9 of the ECSC Treaty states: “The members of the High Authority shall exercise their functions in 
complete independence, in the general interest of the Community. In the fulfillment of their duties, they shall 
neither solicit nor accept instructions from any government or from any organization. They will abstain from all 
conduct incompatible with the supranational character of their functions.” and “Each member state agrees to 
respect this supranational character and to make no effort to influence the members of the High Authority in 
the execution of their duties.” 
8 This framework is based on the Treaty of Rome that was signed on March 25, 1957 and came into force on 
January 1, 1958. A few years later, Regulation 17/62 arranged the implementation of the horizontal restraints 
and abuse of dominance provisions (Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty) and granted substantial power to the 
European Commission as competition law enforcer. 
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coordinated and hierarchical market models.9 The ECSC case fits naturally 
within the hierarchical market tradition, for example. In the hierarchical 
archetype, competition policy is characterised by weak enforcement as 
well as close ties between big business and the political system.10 
Additional, complementary, traits include the dominance of family and 
multinational corporations as well as the relatively weak position of 
workers.11 By contrast, the EEC case reflects the ordoliberal philosophy 
and is therefore primarily compatible with the coordinated market 
tradition. In the coordinated archetype, competition policy is characterised 
by strong enforcement and a clear dividing line between the private and 
the public sphere. More specifically, the aim is to safeguard the 
competitive process, while reducing concentrations of market and political 
power.    
 
In this paper, we show that German and French competition policy can 
also be placed within the coordinated and hierarchical market tradition. 
Akin to the European story, both originate from a mainly hierarchical 
based framework and evolved towards a system compatible with the 
coordinated market model. At the same time, however, we argue that this 
transformation to date has been incomplete in the sense that both 
competition policies still contain some hierarchical elements. Specifically, 
both the German and the French economic ministries can legally interfere 
with merger cases and, in the name of public interest, overrule a blocking 
decision by the national competition authority. Thus, and despite the 
dominance of the ordoliberal doctrine, both the German and French states 
are not (yet) out of sight when it comes to shaping industry structures.        
 
                                                             
9 See, for instance, Whitley (1999), Hall and Soskice (2001), Schneider (2009), Schneider and Soskice (2009). 
Akin to the varieties in capitalism literature, Poli (1915) provides a detailed discussion on why competition 
policies may differ across free market based societies.  
10 See, in particular, Schneider and Soskice (2009). 
11 See Schneider (2009).  
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The next section provides a brief history of German competition policy and 
discusses the transformation from a hierarchical based system to the 
coordinated based framework of today. Section 3 takes a similar approach 
to discuss the French case. Section 4 concludes.   
 
2. The German Case 
2.1 A Brief History of German Competition Policy 
The first German competition law was passed during the Weimar period. 
This Verordnung gegen Missbrauch wirtschaftlicher Machtstellungen came 
into force in 1923 and was directed against abuse of economic power by 
(groups of) firms.12 It did not contain a prohibition of anticompetitive 
combinations such as cartels, but allowed collusive agreements to be 
declared null and void when contractual terms were the consequence of 
monopolistic conduct by one or more members.13 The ordinance was 
enforced by both the Reich Minister of Economics and a newly established 
Kartellgericht; a cartel court that effectively operated as an administrative 
agency.14 This court was not very efficacious, however, and, if anything, 
enhanced the overall positive image of cartels in the Germany of that 
time.15  
As the 1923 cartel ordinance was a control measure and not a prohibition, 
there was a natural connection with the preceding enforcement system. 
Since the German unification in 1871 AD, cartel agreements were 
commonly assessed like any other contract under the German civil code. 
In this context, the main issue was whether the cartel contract must be 
considered contrary to good morals and customs (contra bonos mores et 
decorum). In the last few decades of the 19th century, the dominant view 
                                                             
12 This Kartellverordnung was enacted on November 2, 1923 and is, in fact, considered the first actual 
competition law in Europe.  
13 It also contained a provision on (un)reasonable pricing. See Neumann (1998). See Schwarz (1957) for a 
detailed discussion and English translation of this ordinance.   
14 Schwarz (1957) provides a detailed discussion of the division of enforcement tasks during the Weimar 
republic. 
15 Cartels were viewed effective and ethical organizational forms by many. See Gerber (1998, Chapters 4 & 5).   
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was that such organisations should be permitted or even encouraged, in 
particular during economic depressions:16 
“…it was not contra bonos mores for business men belonging to a branch 
of industry which is suffering from a depression to get together and enter 
into agreements regulating the ways and means of operating their 
industry with a view to promoting recovery. On the contrary such course 
of action would seem to be incumbent upon prudent business men.” 
 
In a similar spirit, cartel contracts were widely viewed as an effective 
means to avoid ruinous competition. This was made explicit in a case 
concerning wood pulp manufacturers in 1897. A defecting member sued 
the cartel, the Sächsischen Holzstoff-Fabrikanten-Verband, for limiting its 
freedom of trade (Gewerbefreiheit).17 The German Supreme Court 
(Reichsgericht) took the side of the conspirators, however, by arguing that 
the cartel did not actually harm the public interest or individual freedom. 
The Reichsgericht thus choose freedom of contract over freedom of 
trade.18 It further reasoned that:19   
 
“…it cannot be generally considered contrary to the public welfare for 
producers or manufacturers to combine with a view to preventing the 
consequent slump in prices. On the contrary, when prices continue to be 
so low that business men are threatened with ruin, combination is not 
merely a legitimate means of self-preservation but also serves the public 
interest.”  
 
This wood pulp decision was taken to mean that cartels should, in 
principle, be considered legal.   
 
                                                             
16 Quote by Wolff (1935) cited in Martin (2010). 
17 The core of the cartel agreement was to sell exclusively through a joint sales agency and non-abiding 
members were obliged to pay a fine. The defecting cartel participant sold its wood pulp directly to several 
paper producers.     
18 As stated by Neumann (1998): “…since freedom of business activity, according to the view of the Court, is 
deemed to encompass freedom to enter contracts which regulate prices in particular industries.” 
19 B. v. den Sächsischen Holzstoff-Fabrikanten-Verband, Reichsgericht, February 4, 1897, 38 R.G.Z. 155 cited in 
Schwarz (1957). This argumentation by the former German Supreme Court confirmed the reasoning by the 
Bavarian appeal court about a decade earlier. In Oberstes Landesgericht Bavaria, April 7, 1888, Entsch. des Ob. 
L. G. 12, 67, this court argued: “…when prices are for a long time so low that financial ruin threatens the 
producers, their combination appears to be not merely a legitimate means of self-preservation, but also a 
measure serving the interests of society.” Citation taken from Martin (2010).       
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After a brief intermezzo in the years following the 1923 ordinance, the 
legal acceptance of cartels was further enhanced when the Nazi regime 
came to power in 1933. A few years prior, an ordinance to meet financial, 
economic and social emergencies was already enacted. This ordinance 
strengthened government involvement by enabling the economics ministry 
to directly interfere with cartel agreements.20 In 1933, the so-called 
Zwangkartellgesetz was passed; a decree that authorized the Reich 
Minister of Economics to virtually force firms into cartels in any industry. 
Not surprisingly, many industries got cartelized in the ensuing years.21 By 
the end of the 1930s, cartels were widespread and effectively agencies in 
a centrally controlled German economy.  
 
In the decade following World War II, German competition policy came 
from the Allied Powers. Already at the Potsdam conference in 1945, there 
was great consensus that the power of German combinations should be 
diminished. Specifically, in paragraph 12 of the Report on the Tripartite 
Conference of Berlin it was stated that:22 
 
“At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be 
decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive 
concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, 
syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.”  
 
This formed the foundation for the first cartel prohibition in German 
history. These types of organizations were declared unlawful through the 
so-called deconcentration laws of 1947, which also allowed for the 
decomposition of powerful companies into smaller units.23  
 
After a series of drafts resulting from the complex political interactions 
between several parties, the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – 
                                                             
20 See Schwarz (1957).  
21 See McGowan (2010).  
22 See the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin – Final Typewritten Copy, August 2, 1945; available at: 
www.trumanlibrary.org. 
23 It should be noted that these laws were enacted by the Western allies and consequently only applied to their 
occupation territories.  
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Kartellgesetz (GWB) was passed and came into effect on January 1, 
1958.24 Apart from some specific exemptions, the GWB outlawed 
horizontal anticompetitive conduct as well as abuse of dominance. More 
generally, this legislation contained many elements that can be found in 
the German competition policy of today.  
 
Interestingly, it took quite a bit longer before a merger policy was 
introduced. Several business interest groups repeatedly and in some 
sense successfully put forth the argument that a stringent merger control 
would harm the competitive position of German firms in international 
markets. The opportunity for adopting a merger control regime arose after 
the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats took office in 1969.25 
Together with the first major reform of the GWB that came into force in 
1973, a system of merger control was installed.26      
 
The evolution of German competition law since 1973 is characterised by a 
series of reforms of the GWB. The third and fourth revision in 1976 and 
1980 shaped the novel merger policy, whereas the fifth in 1989 focused 
on enhancing the position of modestly sized industries. Moreover, the 
number of sectors that were exempted from competition law prohibitions 
was slowly but surely reduced.  
 
Overall, there has been a clear tendency to bring German competition 
policy more and more in line with its counterpart at the European level. 
The seventh amendment that was adopted in June 2005 is illustrative in 
this respect. This amendment centred on the application of European 
antitrust rules in the German jurisdiction and significantly reduced the 
scope of the national competition law.27 The ninth major reform entered 
                                                             
24 The GWB was adopted on July 27, 1957. See Gerber (1998) for a detailed discussion of the (political) process 
leading to the adoption of the GWB. 
25 These parties replaced the conservative government that had been dominating the political arena since 
World War II. 
26 Among others, the new GWB outlawed tacit collusion. See Neumann (1998).  
27 See Klees (2006). 
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into force on June 9, 2017. This last reform was enacted primarily to 
better cope with the digitalization trends in many markets and 
corresponding network effects. 
   
2.2 German Market Competition: From Hierarchy to Coordination? 
Together with some small countries like the Netherlands, Germany has 
had a long reputation for being a cartel’s paradise. The brief description of 
German competition policy history confirms this picture up until the end of 
World War II. During the decade thereafter, however, the legal view on 
such anticompetitive combinations changed dramatically. In particular, the 
loose control measures from before the war were replaced by tight 
prohibitions. Ever since the late 1950s, German and European competition 
policy are very similar.28   
 
As mentioned in the introduction, this development can be positioned 
within the hierarchical and coordinated market tradition. Arguably, 
German competition policy is primarily compatible with the hierarchical 
market model until the end of the Second World War. Till then the system 
was supportive of big business, for example, which in turn made it easier 
for the German state to steer industries in its preferred direction. The 
Zwangkartellgesetz of 1933 is perhaps most illustrative in this regard as it 
allowed the Nazi regime to effectively use its domestic industries as 
weapons of war.        
 
The adoption of the first German competition act, the cartel ordinance of 
1923, is also consistent with this argument. Not only was the enforcement 
of this law for a large part in the hands of the economics ministry, it was 
not very effective either. For an important part, this was simply due to the 
refusal by the Reich Minister of Economics to apply the abuse provisions:29         
 
                                                             
28 Somewhat symbolically, the first actual German cartel prohibition and EEC competition policy both came into 
force on the same date: January 1, 1958.  
29 See Gerber (1998, p. 129). 
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“Decisions were rare and of little importance, primarily because these 
provisions could only be used by the economics minister, and he seldom 
chose to use it! To do so would have been inconsistent with the ‘co-
operative’ arrangements between the ministry and the cartels that 
constituted the informal system for achieving compliance with the 
statute.”  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that both banks and families were frequently 
among the dominant shareholders of large German corporations and 
consequently held key decision-making positions.30 This too is 
characteristic of the hierarchical nature of German market competition up 
until the Second World War.31    
 
This radically changed during the decade thereafter, however, primarily 
under the pressure of the United States and the increasingly popular 
ordoliberal philosophy. From the late 1950s onwards, Germany has 
embraced a market competition model that is characterised by a strong 
competition law framework and an equally strong enforcement policy 
implemented by an independent competition authority, the 
Bundeskartellamt. Since the start, officials working for this authority have 
had little discretion in interpreting the new German competition law.32 
Thus, there has been a clear switch in German competition policy history 
from a hierarchical based model to a coordinated based model. Indeed, 
the current policy framework is arguably quite close to the ordoliberal 
ideal, particularly regarding the combat of anticompetitive conduct.  
 
When it comes to issues of industry structure, however, the competition 
statutes still contain some clear hierarchical elements. Specifically, Section 
42 of the GWB arranges the so-called Ministerial Authorisation for industry 
                                                             
30 See Resch (2005).  
31 On the importance of family ownership and management within the hierarchical market tradition, see 
Schneider (2009).  
32 As stated by Gerber (1998, p. 287): “Decisions were…made according to juridical principles and 
procedures…allowing individuals little opportunity to give special attention to particular defendants. Moreover, 
the personnel of the Federal Cartel Office are largely protected from…temptations…by the Beamten tradition, 
according to which such officials generally cannot be removed from office and normally remain in government 
service throughout their careers".  
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concentrations. Among other things, this provision enables the economics 
ministry to clear a merger even after it has been blocked by the 
Bundeskartellamt.33 This may occur when the benefits of the 
concentration to society are considered to outweigh the costs. Examples 
of such an overriding public interest include the protection of jobs in 
economically weak regions and the safeguarding of energy supplies.34 
Though to date this provision has been rarely applied, its presence does 
imply that in matters of industry structure the German state is still around 
the corner.35    
 
 
3. The French Case 
3.1 A Brief History of French Competition Policy 
Competition policy in France can be traced back to at least the late 1700s 
AD. Not long after the awakening of the French Revolution, the National 
(Constituent) Assembly adopted the Loi Le Chapelier.36 The name of this 
law refers to one of its most prominent initiators, Deputy Isaac-René-Guy 
Le Chapelier, who considered associations and groups in principle 
incompatible with the spirit of the Revolution. Several organizations, such 
as the professional guilds and trade unions, were thought to defend their 
own collective interest rather than that of individuals or society as a whole 
and therefore declared illegal. This law also prohibited market participants 
to make agreements designed to set common prices.37     
                                                             
33 The first part of (the English version of) Section 42 GWB states: “The Federal Minister for Economic Affairs 
and Energy will, upon application, authorise a concentration prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt if, in the 
individual case, the restraint of competition is outweighed by advantages to the economy as a whole resulting 
from the concentration, or if the concentration is justified by an overriding public interest.” 
34 More examples can be found in Verloop and Landes (2003). 
35 About two handfuls of applications have been granted thus far. See, for example, the German Negotiated 
M&A guide available at: www.ibanet.org.   
36 This law was passed on June 14, 1791.  
37 An English translation of the first part of Article 4 of the Chapelier Law (available at: 
http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/370/) states: “It is contrary to the principles of liberty and the Constitution 
for citizens with the same professions, arts, or trades to deliberate or make agreements among themselves 
designed to set prices for their industry or their labor. If such deliberations and agreements are concluded, 
whether accompanied by oath or not, they will be declared unconstitutional, prejudicial to liberty and 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and will be null and void.” 
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In 1810, under the regime of Napoléon Bonaparte, a new Code Pénal saw 
the light of day. The central part on competition was Article 419, which 
stated that:38 
“Those who, by false or slanderous reports, purposely spread among the 
people; or by offering higher prices than those which were asked by the 
venders themselves; or by coalitions or combinations among the principal 
holders of the same kind of merchandize or provisions, tending to prevent 
such goods being sold at all, or being sold under a certain price; or by any 
fraudulent ways or means whatever, shall have effected the enhancement 
or reduction of the price of provisions or merchandize; or of the public 
securities and stocks, above or below the prices which would have been 
determined by the free and natural competition of trade; shall be 
punished with an imprisonment of not less than one month, nor more than 
one year, and a fine of from 500 to 10,000 francs. The offenders may, 
moreover, be placed, by sentence or judgment, under the 
superintendence of the high police, during not less than two 
years, nor more than five years.” 
 
Note that this provision is primarily directed at pricing practices and, in 
particular, prices not resulting from the free and natural competition of 
trade. This soon appeared to be a complex criterion to apply in actual 
cases and also by no means ruled out anticompetitive actions per se. 
Moreover, a body of case law developed throughout the 19th century that 
distinguished between good and bad cartels. Good ones (bonnes unions) 
were defensive coalitions which attempted to stabilize the market, while 
avoiding ruinous competition resulting from excessive supply. By contrast, 
bad cartels (mauvaises unions) were offensive coalitions which attempted 
to limit competition through monopolistic conduct. Since relatively few 
agreements were considered bad, this law had less and less bite. Article 
419 was ultimately amended in 1926, in part, to clarify that price collusion 
is illegal precisely when it has the purpose of creating profits that would 
not result from the natural play of demand and supply.39  
                                                             
38 English translation of the original taken from www.napoleon-series.org. The other main competition rule, 
Article 412, was directed at anticompetitive conduct at auctions. See, for instance, Clement (1974).  
39 See Riesenfeld (1962) and Pace (2007).  
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This revision did not lead to a stricter policy towards cartels, however. On 
the contrary, France increasingly and explicitly recognized this type of 
anticompetitive agreement as an effective means to control industries and 
to ensure economic stability. In fact, the French government even 
required them in some industries during the crisis of the 1930s.40  
In World War II, the Vichy government additionally made extensive use of 
industry associations; some of which remained active in the immediate 
post-war period (e.g., in the coal and steel sector). After Germany signed 
a surrender at the Allied headquarters in the French city of Reims, France 
convincingly choose to follow such a state-led route to rebuild the country.  
This planning-oriented approach manifested itself in at least three ways. 
First, the Commissariat Général du Plan was established; a planning board 
which was given the task to design plans to support the recovery of the 
French economy. The first board, led by Jean Monnet, addressed the 
urgent issue of how to allocate scarce resources right after the end of the 
Second World War. It further advocated the need for systematic and 
large-scale investments, particularly in six so-called priority sectors: coal, 
steel, electricity, cement, agricultural machinery and transportation.41 
Second, there was a series of nationalization decrees, which effectively 
restricted competition in key sectors including aviation, insurance, 
banking, electricity and gas.42 Third, the government issued an ordinance 
in June 1945, which enabled the extensive use of price controls and wage 
freezes.43 
The 1945 ordinance additionally prohibited a collection of what was 
referred to as illicit pricing practices, which included refusals to deal and 
several forms of price discrimination.44 Combined with a series of 
                                                             
40 See OECD (2003) and Riesenfeld (1960), which also provides several concrete examples.    
41 See Djelic (2001). 
42 See Riesenfeld (1960) and Djelic (2001). This increased state-control included well-known companies such as 
Air France, Renault and Crédit Lyonnais.   
43 Ordinance No. 45-1483.  
44 See, for instance, OECD (2003). A detailed discussion can be found in Riesenfeld (1960).  
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amendments enacted in the ensuing years, this culminated in a failed 
attempt to adopt a general competition law in the early 1950s.45 This 
attempt was unsuccessful not least because of a deeply rooted conviction 
among French politicians that the planification policy was the best way to 
allocate resources and to support home industries in emerging global 
markets.46 In the words of Fridenson (1997, p. 226): 
“In 1950 the French government finally decided not to send to parliament 
an antitrust bill which Jean Monnet and his Planning Commission had 
drafted. A majority of French politicians wanted to keep as much interfirm 
cooperation as possible in times of hardening international competition.”      
 
As an, arguably imperfect, substitute, the French government issued a 
decree stating that:47 
 
“All concerted actions, agreements, express or implied understandings, or 
coalitions, in whatever form and for whatever reason, which have as their 
object or may have as their effect restraint of the free exercise of 
competition by impeding the reduction of costs or prices or by 
encouraging an artificial increase in prices.”     
 
This decree extended the 1945 price control ordinance and, in fact, reads 
very much like a modern competition law.48 It was not only directed 
against cartels, but also at restrictive business practices such as resale 
price maintenance. This provision appeared far less effective in practice, 
however, which was partly due to two clear exemptions. Exempted were 
agreements (i) which result from the application of a legislative or 
regulatory measure, or (ii) which are demonstrated by the parties to have 
the effect of improving production, or assuring the development of 
economic progress by means of rationalisation and specialisation.49 
                                                             
45 See Pace and Seidel (2013). 
46 As remarked by Souam (1998, p. 206): “The idea that economic efficiency is better guaranteed by competitive 
markets had real difficulty achieving acceptance among policy-makers.”   
47 This decree, No. 53-704, was passed on August 9, 1953. It was amended to include an abuse of dominance 
provision ten years later, law No. 63-628.  
48 It has been suggested that this law was heavily inspired by American antitrust legislation, in part because it 
was generally felt that antitrust policy was an important cause of the success of American enterprises. See 
Clement (1974).  
49 These exemptions were arranged in Article 59 ter. See Pace and Seidel (2013) and Riesenfeld (1960). 
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Moreover, the enforcement of this rule was primarily reactive and cases 
were mostly dealt with on an ad hoc basis.50 
   
A more convincing move towards contemporary competition law 
enforcement took place a few decades later. Partly driven by the 
international oil crises, France faced a severe economic downturn with 
high inflation and unemployment during the second half of the 1970s. The 
response by the government was, however, radically different compared 
to the crisis years of the 1930s. Competition policy was intensified rather 
than relaxed and more resources were made available to the newly 
installed Commission de la Concurrence.51 Additionally, France adopted a 
merger control regime. 
 
This change in direction was reinforced by a reform in 1986, which 
effectively removed price controls altogether. The 1986 ordinance further 
transformed the Commission de la Concurrence into the Conseil de la 
Concurrence. In addition to its advisory task, this new body was given the 
right to start proceedings and to impose penalties without the Minister of 
Economy being involved. Moreover, it brought the French competition 
rules in line with the European ones as laid down in the Treaty of Rome. 
This ordinance is therefore argued to have been of great symbolic value as 
it made France one of the first to clearly make its competition policy 
compatible with the European counterpart.52    
 
Some amendments in 1987 allowed for appeals against the authority’s 
decisions at the Cour d’appel de Paris, thereby enhancing the separation 
between the Economic Ministry and competition law enforcement. The 
Conseil de la Concurrence was allocated even more power in 2001 when 
French competition laws were restated and codified in the Nouvelles 
                                                             
50 Also, some commentators have argued that the French government agreed only on the condition that “no 
one would ever hear about it”. See Dumez and Jeunemaître (1996).  
51 This commission effectively replaced the Commission Technique des Ententes; an advisory body that was 
active since 1953.  
52 See Chapter 10 of Gerber (1998). 
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Regulations Economique (NRE).53 Among other things, it provided more 
scope for proactive competition law enforcement and allowed for more 
severe fines. Also, a system of self-reporting was installed that induces 
those who are acting in breach of competition laws to inform the authority 
in exchange for a reduction of the antitrust penalty.     
 
The last substantial change took place about a decade ago. In 2009, a 
new competition authority, the Authorité de la Concurrence, was 
established.54 This independent administrative authority combines the 
several enforcement tasks that were still allocated among the Conseil de 
la Concurrence and the Economic Ministry. Important implications of this 
reform are that it enables the authority to proactively form opinions on 
(draft) competition legislation and that it has become responsible for 
merger control.55 Like in Germany, however, the Minister of Economy can 
still intervene in the merger process by requesting an in-depth so-called 
phase 2 investigation or overturn the authority’s decision when public 
interest demands it. Reasons for the latter include industrial development, 
employment and the competitiveness of French companies operating in 
international markets.56        
 
3.2 French Market Competition: From Hierarchy to Coordination? 
The short historical overview of French competition policy sketches a 
picture of a slow but sure move towards the ordoliberal model of 
coordinated market competition. Most notably, competition policy has 
become increasingly independent from state politics. Akin to the German 
case, however, its origins contain important elements that arguably have 
a better fit with the hierarchical market tradition. In particular, French 
competition policy has repeatedly favoured big business over labour.   
                                                             
53 See OECD (2003) and Lachnit (2016).  
54 It was installed on March 2, 2009, by reforming the Conseil de la Concurrence. See the Law of Modernisation 
of the Economy, No. 2008-776, and the Ordinance of Modernisation of Competition Regulation, No. 2008-1161. 
55 See Lasserre (2009). 
56 See Article L. 430-7-1 of the French Commercial Code (Code de Commerce). 
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Indeed, one characteristic feature of the hierarchical market model is that 
organization of labour is weak. This was certainly the case in the early 
years of French competition policy. For instance, right from the beginning, 
Le Chapelier Law banned strikes and ruled out any association of workers. 
Unions and other types of cooperation were allowed again after 1864 
when the coalition offense of Article 419 was abolished.57 In most cases, 
however, French businesses benefited more from this than did their 
employees.  
 
In the years directly following World War II, labour was again 
marginalized. Several “modernization commissions” were installed by the 
planning board, for example, which brought together representatives of 
capital and labour as well as planning staff and experts. Yet, it quickly 
became apparent that the influence of the working class would be very 
limited. In fact, this cooperative setup enhanced ties between big 
companies and the French state. As remarked by Michalet (1974): 
 
“The representatives of the workers’ unions…have only played a minor 
role. The Commissions du Plan have contributed largely toward bringing 
together the state on the one hand and large enterprises on the other.”  
 
And although the first actual French competition law was around the 
corner, the 1953 decree soon appeared ineffective in protecting market 
competition and, in particular, in mitigating the power of big businesses.58 
For a significant part this was due to the widely held believe that French 
firms were too small to be competitive on a global scale. Indeed, the 
planning board openly favoured:59    
 
“…concentration within each sector of industry, larger production units and 
firms, the adoption of machines and technologies that would make mass 
                                                             
57 See Souam (1998).  
58 As Jenny (1990, p. 150) wrote: “Besides the obvious unwillingness of public authorities to rely on market 
forces in a competitive environment to achieve efficiency, the system designed in 1953 was largely ineffective 
because the legal means of the Minister in charge of Economic Affairs were insufficient to dissuade firms from 
engaging in anticompetitive practices either because they did not care about the warnings that he could issue 
or because the courts did not handle speedily and effectively the cases which he decided to refer to them.” 
59 See Djelic (2001, p. 137) 
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production possible, and a rationalization of management and production 
methods.” 
 
This positive perspective on industry concentration manifested itself in 
several ways. First, the French government largely ignored small and 
medium-sized companies and primarily focused on the creation of national 
champions. Second, the number of multinational companies active in 
France substantially increased during the 1960s.60 Third, external growth 
through merger was actively encouraged.61      
 
“…starting in 1965, a tax deduction was offered to any firm willing to 
merge with another firm. This tax deduction…was applied to all mergers, 
whether horizontal, vertical, or conglomeral. What is more, the Ministry of 
Industry, during the sixties and first half of the seventies, directly 
arranged mergers among the leaders of various key industrial sectors 
such as steel, computers, glass, etc.” 
 
Not surprisingly, France witnessed a large number of mergers in the 
1960s and 1970s. In sum, between the Second World War and the second 
oil crisis in the late 1970s: “…the French authorities were obsessed with 
increasing the size of firms”.62   
 
The combination of big (diversified, multinational) companies and 
atomistic, weakly organized, labour makes French market competition 
primarily compatible with the hierarchical capitalist model, at least until 
the late 1970s. As mentioned above, however, there was an important 
competition policy reform in 1977 and this reform pushed France in the 
direction of the European coordinated market model. For a significant 
part, this switch was due to the impetus of Prime Minister Raymond Barre. 
Not only was he a trained economist and former chairman of the European 
Commission, he had also published on the, at the time relatively novel, 
ordoliberal philosophy in the 1950s.     
 
                                                             
60 See Michalet (1974).  
61 Jenny (1981, p. 478). 
62 Jenny (1981, p. 477).  
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As mentioned above, the coordinated market model requires a strong and 
autonomous competition authority.63    
 
“…the monopoly office would also have to be made into a strong 
institution. It would have to have significant enforcement authority so that 
it effectively could demand compliance, and it would have to have the 
resources necessary to operate quickly and decisively and to attract and 
maintain personnel of the highest caliber…and they had to be largely 
protected from outside political or pecuniary influences.”  
 
Regarding resources, these were very limited until 1977. Those who were 
given the task to enforce French competition laws were few in number, 
only partly specialized and typically had many other tasks to fulfil.64 The 
establishment of the new Commission de la Concurrence implied more 
resources and a severe enhancement of French competition law 
enforcement.  
 
Regarding autonomy, this was de facto absent in decades following World 
War II as the Economic Ministry was the main enforcer and ultimately had 
the final say in competition cases. However, the French competition 
authority became more and more independent since the late 1970s. After 
a hesitant start in which the Commission de la Concurrence remained 
primarily an advisory body, a major step towards independence occurred 
in 1986 with the establishment of the Conseil de la Concurrence.65 As 
Gerber (1998, p. 406) put it: 
 
“…the key was to refashion the main enforcement institution, now called 
the Conseil de la Concurrence (‘Conseil’). Drafters of the legislation were 
aware that it could achieve its aims only if those making decisions within it 
were in the position to withstand the deeply-rooted influence of dirigisme. 
This meant increased independence for the body administrating the law 
and they thus renamed it to reflect the image of increased independence.”      
 
Yet, it was not until a decade ago that French competition law 
enforcement was put in the hands of a single competition agency; the 
                                                             
63 See Gerber (1998, p. 255). 
64 See Clement (1974).  
65 See Gerber (1998) and Lachnit (2016).   
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Authorité de la Concurrence. There is little doubt that this organizational 
reform has strongly supported the independence of the competition 
authority and consequently can be considered an important step towards 
the ordoliberal ideal.  
 
This does not mean that the current system is completely immune to 
government interference, however. Indeed, similar to the German 
counterpart, the French minister of economic affairs can still intervene in 
merger processes when such intervention is considered in the public 
interest. Thus, even though the Economic Ministry undeniably has lost 
terrain in terms of decision-making power, particularly in cases dealing 
with anticompetitive conduct, it did not completely vanish from the market 
competition scene. Specifically, when it comes to competition matters 
dealing with industry structure, the French state has never been far away. 
     
4. Concluding Remarks 
On February 6, 2019, the European Commission communicated that it had 
blocked the proposed merger by the French Alstom and the German 
Siemens Mobility. The main reason for preventing this merger is that it 
would result in excessive industry concentration in some signalling 
markets as well as in the very high-speed train market. The European 
Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, additionally clarified 
that the companies did not adequately address the Commission’s 
competition concerns. The French economy minister Bruno Le Maire was 
quick to respond that he, together with the German economy minister 
Peter Altmaier, will soon put forward a proposal to reform the European 
competition law system. In particular, this new policy should incentivize 
European companies to grow and be ready to compete on a global scale. 
Merkel and Macron have also recently advocated the need for “European 
Champions” to face the increasing competitive pressure from China and 
other parts of the world.   
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This recent case, on the one hand, illustrates that contemporary European 
competition policy functions largely like the ordoliberals envisaged. The 
competition authority independently assessed the proposed merger and 
concluded that approval would harm the competitive order in the 
particular markets. On the other hand, the same case also shows that 
competition policy may be under severe pressure from the state. This 
paper has shown that this is anything but new.66 In both Germany and 
France, competition policy has been frequently challenged by politicians 
and big business representatives. One recurring argument is that 
industrial giants are required to stand the test of competition in 
international markets.  
 
There is little doubt that today’s competition policy in both countries is 
mainly compatible with the coordinated market model. Yet, when it comes 
to market structure, we have shown there are some elements that fit 
more naturally within the hierarchical market tradition. Following the 
above statement by Jean Monnet, the political response to the European 
Commission’s decision on the Alstom-Siemens merger reveals that France 
and Germany may indeed have a common interest beyond their 
differences and geographical boundaries. This common interest, however, 
need not necessarily be a competitive order safeguarded by a strong 
competition policy.       
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                             
66 In this respect, see also the recent study by Dinc and Erel (2013) who find empirical evidence for economic 
nationalism in European Merger and Acquisitions cases.  
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